外交政策:中国为什么会与塔利班对话?

来源:百度文库 编辑:超级军网 时间:2024/03/29 03:56:23
外交政策:中国为什么会与塔利班对话?
原文地址:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/20/why_is_china_talking_to_the_taliban
原创翻译:龙腾网

Hamid Karzai's derailment of this week's planned U.S. peace talks with the Taliban may have been a disappointment to Washington's hopes of ending its longest war -- but it disappointed Beijing, too. China welcomed the breakthrough in the Qatar process, and sees a political settlement in Afghanistan as increasingly important for its economic and security interests in the region. As a result, China's support for reconciliation between Kabul and the Taliban has become a fixture of its burgeoning diplomatic activity on Afghanistan's post-2014 future.
哈米德卡尔扎伊在计划中的美国与塔利班的和平会谈中变卦,这对于希望结束这场持续时间最长的战争的华盛顿来讲有点失望——但这也同样令北京失望。中国欢迎在卡塔尔进程中出现突破,而且认为在阿富汗的政治和解对于其在该地区的经济以及安全利益越来越重要。结果,中国将会把支持喀布尔与塔利班之间的和解作为其对待2014年以后阿富汗的外交政策的一项固定政策。

Over the last year, China has been expanding its direct contacts with the Taliban and sounding them out on security issues that range from separatist groups in the Chinese region of Xinjiang to the protection of Chinese resource investments, according to interviews with officials and experts in Beijing, Washington, Kabul, Islamabad, and Peshawar. While Beijing would like to see the reconciliation talks succeed in preventing Afghanistan from falling back into civil war, it is not counting on their success, and thus is preparing to deal with whatever constellation of political forces emerges in Afghanistan after the United States withdraws.
根据与北京,华盛顿,喀布尔,伊斯兰堡,巴沙瓦的官员以及专家的采访,在过去的几年中,中国一直在扩大其与塔利班的直接接触,试探其对诸如中国新疆地区的分离组织以及中国的资源投资保护等诸多安全问题的立场。虽然北京乐于见到和解谈判成功以防止阿富汗重新陷入内战,但中国并不将希望寄托于其成功上,所以中国准备与在美国撤走后的阿富汗崛起的任何一支政治力量进行对话。

While even tentative U.S. and European meetings with the Taliban generate headlines, China's substantive dealings with them tend to slip under the radar. After the 9/11 attacks and the Taliban's fall from power, Beijing quietly maintained a relationship with the Quetta Shura, the Taliban's leadership council based across the border in Pakistan. In a conversation, one former Chinese official claimed that besides Pakistan, China was the only country to continue this contact. Over the last 18 months, exchanges have taken place more regularly, and China has started to admit their existence in meetings with U.S. officials, according to people familiar with the matter. The same sources said that Taliban representatives have held meetings with Chinese officials both in Pakistan and in China. Although the possibility of active Chinese support for peace talks has been discussed, it appears the focus has been on a narrower set of Chinese objectives: as one Pakistani expert noted, "it has so far been about mitigating [Chinese] security concerns rather than reconciliation."
尽管任何不确定的美欧与塔利班的接触都会成为头条,但是中国与塔利班的大量的秘密交易却能逃过一劫。在911之后塔利班下台,中国悄悄的与基达人民立法会保持联系,基达人民立法会是位于巴基斯坦边境的塔利班领导机构。在一次会议上,一位中国前官员声称:除了巴基斯坦,中国是唯一与其保持联系的国家。熟悉此类事物的人事声称,在过去的十八个月中,他们之间的交流越来越频繁,中国开始在与美国官员的会谈中承认他们的存在。同样的消息来源也说中国已经与塔利班的代表在巴基斯坦与中国境内举行了会谈。尽管人们曾经讨论过中国对和平谈判提供积极协助的可能性,但是焦点似乎只集中在中国所追求的的几个少数目标:正如一位巴基斯坦专家讲到的那样,“中国所长期关注的是缓解其安全担忧而不是和解。”

In China's dealings with the Taliban, the independence movement among China's Uighur Muslim minority has always been its biggest concern. In the late 1990s, Beijing worried that the Taliban government in Kabul was providing a haven for Uighur militants, who had fled Chinese crackdowns in Xinjiang and set up training camps in Afghanistan. In meetings in December 2000 in Kandahar, the Taliban's reclusive leader Mohammed Omar assured the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan Lu Shulin that the Taliban would not "allow any group to use its territory to conduct any such operations" against China. In exchange, Omar sought two things from China: formal political recognition and protection from U.N. sanctions.
中国与塔利班打交道时,中国维吾尔MSL少数民族的独立运动一直是其最大的担忧。在90年代后期,北京担忧喀布尔的塔利班政府会成为逃离中国镇压的维吾尔武装分子的避难所以及其在阿富汗成立训练营。在2000年坎大哈的会晤中,塔利班的幕后领导穆罕默德奥马尔对中国驻巴基斯坦大使陆树林保证说塔利班不会“允许任何组织用其领土从事任何反对中国的活动。”作为交换,奥马尔向北京寻求两样东西:正式的政治承认以及免受联合国的制裁。

Neither side delivered satisfactory results. The Taliban did not expel Uighur militants from its territory. Though it prohibited them from operating their own camps, it allowed them to embed with other militant groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. At the same time, China moderated its stance at the U.N. Security Council to abstain on sanctions that targeted the Taliban and established trade links that would help mitigate their impact, but it didn't use its veto power. Beijing deferred its decision on giving the Taliban diplomatic recognition, which Washington's reaction to the 9/11 attacks soon made moot anyway.
哪一方都没有交出令人满意的答卷。塔利班并没有从其领土上驱逐维吾尔武装分子。尽管禁止其开设自己的训练营,但是却允许他们参加其他的武装团体,例如乌兹别克斯坦的伊斯兰运动。与此同时中国软化了其在安理会的立场,在针对塔利班的制裁中投了弃权票,并且与塔利班建立了贸易联系以削弱制裁的影响,但是中国没有动用否决权。北京也推迟了给予塔利班外交承认的决定,因为美国对911的反应会让其变得富有争议。

The two sides, however, realized they could do business with each other. The Taliban's then-ambassador to Pakistan described his Chinese counterpart in Islamabad in the late 1990s as "the only one to maintain a good relationship" with the Taliban. In fact, China was signing economic deals in Kabul the very day of the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.
然而双方都认识到他们可以相互做生意。那时的塔利班驻巴基斯坦大使这样形容90年代末他在伊斯兰堡的中国同僚为“唯一与塔利班保持良好关系的人”。事实上,就在袭击双子塔与五角大楼的那一天中国在喀布尔签订了经济协议。

Since then, China has forged a good working relationship with the Karzai government, without ever becoming too closely identified with it by the insurgency. Today, China's priority remains ensuring that any territory under Taliban control won't function as a base for Uighur militant groups. The small remaining band of Uighur fighters -- perhaps as few as 40 men -- are primarily located in the North Waziristan region of Pakistan, in remote territory under the influence of a commander with ties to both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. China has been seeking assurances that the sheltering of Uighurs will not take place on a larger scale in Afghanistan itself. It also wants its multi-billion dollar investments in Afghanistan protected from Taliban attacks. Beijing's largest economic project, the Aynak copper mine, is in territory with a strong presence of the Haqqani network, an insurgent group that is closely allied with the Taliban.
自从那时起,中国与卡尔扎伊政府保持了良好的工作关系,同时又不让恐怖分子认为其与政府走的太近。今天中国的优先方向仍然是确保任何在塔利班控制下的领土都不会成为维吾尔武装分子的基地。残留的小股维吾尔武装分子——大约40人——主要位于巴基斯坦的的瓦齐里斯坦的北部地区,该地区偏远而且受与巴塔与阿塔有联系的指挥人员的影响。中国正在不断寻求保证以确保在阿富汗不会为更大大规模的维吾尔族人提供庇护。中国也希望其在阿富汗的数十亿美元的投资不受塔利班的袭击。北京最大的经济项目,Aynak铜矿位于Haqqani组织活动频繁的区域,而haqqani组织是一个与塔利班有紧密联系的叛乱组织。

China's dealings with the Islamist insurgents also hedge against the risk that the Taliban might decide to view Chinese citizens, investments, or even mainland China itself as a legitimate target. Militants blamed China for the Pakistani government's 2007 decision to launch an assault on the Red Mosque, a pro-Taliban stronghold in Islamabad, and duly retaliated with a series of attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan. Beijing is also increasingly nervous about how Taliban-linked groups view Chinese policy in Xinjiang. The shooting of a Chinese woman in Peshawar in 2011 was the first (and only) occasion that a Pakistani Taliban spokesman pinned an attack on "revenge for the Chinese government killing our Muslim brothers" in Xinjiang, the region where most Uighurs live.
中国与伊斯兰暴乱者的交易可以避免塔利班将中国公民,投资甚至中国大陆看作是理所应当的袭击目标。武装分子将2007年巴基斯坦发动对位于伊斯兰堡的亲塔利班的Red Mosque的攻击怪罪于中国,随后发动了一系列针对在巴工作的中国工人的袭击作为报复。北京对于与塔利班有联系的组织如何看待中国的新疆政策而感到愈发紧张。2011年一位中国妇女在白沙瓦遭受枪击,这是第一次(也是唯一一次)巴塔发言人声称是为了“为中国政府杀害我们的新疆MSL兄弟复仇”而发动袭击。

Nonetheless, sources in Pakistan who have talked to the militant commanders say that senior Taliban leaders are keen not to alienate Beijing -- they have enough enemies already. The Afghan Taliban continues to see the benefit of close ties with one of the few countries that can restrain their sometimes-overbearing Pakistani sponsors. As a result, according to Chinese sources who work closely with the Foreign Ministry in Beijing, Taliban interlocutors have provided the same reassurances to China that they gave in the past: they will not allow Afghanistan to be used as a base of attacks and want to develop economic relations with the Chinese. But these sources also say that Chinese officials remain apprehensive. They doubt the Taliban's capacity and willingness to deliver on its promises, particularly on the matter of safe havens for Uighur militants, and they fear a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would destabilize Pakistan and the region. Beijing has therefore been increasingly keen to see a political settlement in Afghanistan that ensures a stable balance of power
然而来自巴基斯坦与军方指挥官有联系的消息人士称塔利班的高层并不希望疏远北京——他们已经有太多的敌人了。中国作为少数可以制衡有时显得飞扬跋扈的巴基斯坦资助者的国家之一,塔利班明白与中国保持紧密的联系会带来好处。结果据经常与北京的外交部工作的消息人士称,塔利班谈判者也提供了他们过去曾给予过的保证:他们不允许阿富汗成为恐怖袭击的基地而且愿意与中国发展经贸关系。但是这些消息也证明了中国官员仍然感到很忧虑,他们对塔利班实现诺言的能力以及决心持怀疑态度,特别是在阿富汗会成为维吾尔武装分子的安全避难所这一点上,他们担心塔利班如果在阿富汗胜利那将会使巴基斯坦变及其周围地区变的不稳定。所以北京越来越急切的希望达成一个政治和解以确保力量的平衡。

The United States shares this basic objective of a stable Afghanistan, and after years of pushing Beijing to increase its commitment there, U.S. officials told me they are happy that China has become more active in the region. Chinese officials have even mentioned to their U.S. counterparts the possibility of Beijing using its own contacts with the Taliban to help support reconciliation talks, according to sources familiar with the discussions.
美国也追求一个稳定的阿富汗这一基本的目标,在经过数年努力使中国增加其在该地区的投入后,美国官员告诉我他们乐于见到中国已经在该地区变得更积极。据与谈判熟悉的消息人士称中国官员已经提出北京利用其与塔利班的联系来协助和解谈判。

So will Beijing play a greater role in the upcoming peace talks among Kabul, the Taliban, and the United States? Probably not. Despite tentative support from all three parties, Beijing has been deterred not only by its caution over involvement with a risky process but by Islamabad. Pakistan is clearly uncomfortable with its closest friend's presence in a policy area that Beijing was previously willing to outsource to them.
所以北京会在与喀布尔,塔利班,美国的和平谈判中扮演更大的角色吗?可能不会,尽管有来自三方面的不确定的的支持,北京因为卷入这一危险过程所带来的警告以及伊斯兰堡而一直没有介入。以前在一些政治领域中国总是将工作外包给巴基斯坦,但是看到其最紧密的朋友在这些领域内的现身,巴基斯坦肯定感到会不舒服。

China's stance could prove useful for U.S. negotiators in Doha, however, if the talks move forward. While Beijing still treads carefully in its bilateral relationship with Pakistan, it knows it holds the upper hand, and is willing to exert pressure when important Chinese interests are at stake. China prioritizes stability in Afghanistan over sustaining Pakistani influence in the region; sources in Beijing who follow discussions between the two sides say that officials have made this increasingly clear to Islamabad.
然而,如果谈判进一步向前推进,中国的立场或许会在多哈与美国的谈判中被证明是有用的。中国仍然会密切地推进其与巴基斯坦的双边关系,而且他也明白这会使其占据上风,当中国的重要利益面临威胁时时将会施加压力。中国更为重视的是阿富汗的稳定而不是巴基斯坦在该地区的影响力。来自北京参与两边讨论的消息人士称中国官员已经将此立场日益明确的传递给伊斯兰堡。

In the 1990s, China paid little attention as Afghanistan slid into civil war and the Taliban seized control of the country. Now, with greater interests at stake, it doesn't want to see the same story play out after the U.S. withdrawal in 2014. If history were to repeat itself, however, there are no prizes for guessing which country would be the first to send a business delegation to Kandahar after the Taliban's return.
在90年代,中国对于阿富汗陷入内战不太关心然后塔利班控制了这个国家。现在,随着越来越大的利益受到威胁,在美国2014年撤军后中国不想看到历史重演。但是如果将来历史重演,我们肯定会猜到当塔利班回归后谁会向坎大哈派遣第一个贸易代表团。外交政策:中国为什么会与塔利班对话?
原文地址:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/20/why_is_china_talking_to_the_taliban
原创翻译:龙腾网

Hamid Karzai's derailment of this week's planned U.S. peace talks with the Taliban may have been a disappointment to Washington's hopes of ending its longest war -- but it disappointed Beijing, too. China welcomed the breakthrough in the Qatar process, and sees a political settlement in Afghanistan as increasingly important for its economic and security interests in the region. As a result, China's support for reconciliation between Kabul and the Taliban has become a fixture of its burgeoning diplomatic activity on Afghanistan's post-2014 future.
哈米德卡尔扎伊在计划中的美国与塔利班的和平会谈中变卦,这对于希望结束这场持续时间最长的战争的华盛顿来讲有点失望——但这也同样令北京失望。中国欢迎在卡塔尔进程中出现突破,而且认为在阿富汗的政治和解对于其在该地区的经济以及安全利益越来越重要。结果,中国将会把支持喀布尔与塔利班之间的和解作为其对待2014年以后阿富汗的外交政策的一项固定政策。

Over the last year, China has been expanding its direct contacts with the Taliban and sounding them out on security issues that range from separatist groups in the Chinese region of Xinjiang to the protection of Chinese resource investments, according to interviews with officials and experts in Beijing, Washington, Kabul, Islamabad, and Peshawar. While Beijing would like to see the reconciliation talks succeed in preventing Afghanistan from falling back into civil war, it is not counting on their success, and thus is preparing to deal with whatever constellation of political forces emerges in Afghanistan after the United States withdraws.
根据与北京,华盛顿,喀布尔,伊斯兰堡,巴沙瓦的官员以及专家的采访,在过去的几年中,中国一直在扩大其与塔利班的直接接触,试探其对诸如中国新疆地区的分离组织以及中国的资源投资保护等诸多安全问题的立场。虽然北京乐于见到和解谈判成功以防止阿富汗重新陷入内战,但中国并不将希望寄托于其成功上,所以中国准备与在美国撤走后的阿富汗崛起的任何一支政治力量进行对话。

While even tentative U.S. and European meetings with the Taliban generate headlines, China's substantive dealings with them tend to slip under the radar. After the 9/11 attacks and the Taliban's fall from power, Beijing quietly maintained a relationship with the Quetta Shura, the Taliban's leadership council based across the border in Pakistan. In a conversation, one former Chinese official claimed that besides Pakistan, China was the only country to continue this contact. Over the last 18 months, exchanges have taken place more regularly, and China has started to admit their existence in meetings with U.S. officials, according to people familiar with the matter. The same sources said that Taliban representatives have held meetings with Chinese officials both in Pakistan and in China. Although the possibility of active Chinese support for peace talks has been discussed, it appears the focus has been on a narrower set of Chinese objectives: as one Pakistani expert noted, "it has so far been about mitigating [Chinese] security concerns rather than reconciliation."
尽管任何不确定的美欧与塔利班的接触都会成为头条,但是中国与塔利班的大量的秘密交易却能逃过一劫。在911之后塔利班下台,中国悄悄的与基达人民立法会保持联系,基达人民立法会是位于巴基斯坦边境的塔利班领导机构。在一次会议上,一位中国前官员声称:除了巴基斯坦,中国是唯一与其保持联系的国家。熟悉此类事物的人事声称,在过去的十八个月中,他们之间的交流越来越频繁,中国开始在与美国官员的会谈中承认他们的存在。同样的消息来源也说中国已经与塔利班的代表在巴基斯坦与中国境内举行了会谈。尽管人们曾经讨论过中国对和平谈判提供积极协助的可能性,但是焦点似乎只集中在中国所追求的的几个少数目标:正如一位巴基斯坦专家讲到的那样,“中国所长期关注的是缓解其安全担忧而不是和解。”

In China's dealings with the Taliban, the independence movement among China's Uighur Muslim minority has always been its biggest concern. In the late 1990s, Beijing worried that the Taliban government in Kabul was providing a haven for Uighur militants, who had fled Chinese crackdowns in Xinjiang and set up training camps in Afghanistan. In meetings in December 2000 in Kandahar, the Taliban's reclusive leader Mohammed Omar assured the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan Lu Shulin that the Taliban would not "allow any group to use its territory to conduct any such operations" against China. In exchange, Omar sought two things from China: formal political recognition and protection from U.N. sanctions.
中国与塔利班打交道时,中国维吾尔MSL少数民族的独立运动一直是其最大的担忧。在90年代后期,北京担忧喀布尔的塔利班政府会成为逃离中国镇压的维吾尔武装分子的避难所以及其在阿富汗成立训练营。在2000年坎大哈的会晤中,塔利班的幕后领导穆罕默德奥马尔对中国驻巴基斯坦大使陆树林保证说塔利班不会“允许任何组织用其领土从事任何反对中国的活动。”作为交换,奥马尔向北京寻求两样东西:正式的政治承认以及免受联合国的制裁。

Neither side delivered satisfactory results. The Taliban did not expel Uighur militants from its territory. Though it prohibited them from operating their own camps, it allowed them to embed with other militant groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. At the same time, China moderated its stance at the U.N. Security Council to abstain on sanctions that targeted the Taliban and established trade links that would help mitigate their impact, but it didn't use its veto power. Beijing deferred its decision on giving the Taliban diplomatic recognition, which Washington's reaction to the 9/11 attacks soon made moot anyway.
哪一方都没有交出令人满意的答卷。塔利班并没有从其领土上驱逐维吾尔武装分子。尽管禁止其开设自己的训练营,但是却允许他们参加其他的武装团体,例如乌兹别克斯坦的伊斯兰运动。与此同时中国软化了其在安理会的立场,在针对塔利班的制裁中投了弃权票,并且与塔利班建立了贸易联系以削弱制裁的影响,但是中国没有动用否决权。北京也推迟了给予塔利班外交承认的决定,因为美国对911的反应会让其变得富有争议。

The two sides, however, realized they could do business with each other. The Taliban's then-ambassador to Pakistan described his Chinese counterpart in Islamabad in the late 1990s as "the only one to maintain a good relationship" with the Taliban. In fact, China was signing economic deals in Kabul the very day of the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.
然而双方都认识到他们可以相互做生意。那时的塔利班驻巴基斯坦大使这样形容90年代末他在伊斯兰堡的中国同僚为“唯一与塔利班保持良好关系的人”。事实上,就在袭击双子塔与五角大楼的那一天中国在喀布尔签订了经济协议。

Since then, China has forged a good working relationship with the Karzai government, without ever becoming too closely identified with it by the insurgency. Today, China's priority remains ensuring that any territory under Taliban control won't function as a base for Uighur militant groups. The small remaining band of Uighur fighters -- perhaps as few as 40 men -- are primarily located in the North Waziristan region of Pakistan, in remote territory under the influence of a commander with ties to both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. China has been seeking assurances that the sheltering of Uighurs will not take place on a larger scale in Afghanistan itself. It also wants its multi-billion dollar investments in Afghanistan protected from Taliban attacks. Beijing's largest economic project, the Aynak copper mine, is in territory with a strong presence of the Haqqani network, an insurgent group that is closely allied with the Taliban.
自从那时起,中国与卡尔扎伊政府保持了良好的工作关系,同时又不让恐怖分子认为其与政府走的太近。今天中国的优先方向仍然是确保任何在塔利班控制下的领土都不会成为维吾尔武装分子的基地。残留的小股维吾尔武装分子——大约40人——主要位于巴基斯坦的的瓦齐里斯坦的北部地区,该地区偏远而且受与巴塔与阿塔有联系的指挥人员的影响。中国正在不断寻求保证以确保在阿富汗不会为更大大规模的维吾尔族人提供庇护。中国也希望其在阿富汗的数十亿美元的投资不受塔利班的袭击。北京最大的经济项目,Aynak铜矿位于Haqqani组织活动频繁的区域,而haqqani组织是一个与塔利班有紧密联系的叛乱组织。

China's dealings with the Islamist insurgents also hedge against the risk that the Taliban might decide to view Chinese citizens, investments, or even mainland China itself as a legitimate target. Militants blamed China for the Pakistani government's 2007 decision to launch an assault on the Red Mosque, a pro-Taliban stronghold in Islamabad, and duly retaliated with a series of attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan. Beijing is also increasingly nervous about how Taliban-linked groups view Chinese policy in Xinjiang. The shooting of a Chinese woman in Peshawar in 2011 was the first (and only) occasion that a Pakistani Taliban spokesman pinned an attack on "revenge for the Chinese government killing our Muslim brothers" in Xinjiang, the region where most Uighurs live.
中国与伊斯兰暴乱者的交易可以避免塔利班将中国公民,投资甚至中国大陆看作是理所应当的袭击目标。武装分子将2007年巴基斯坦发动对位于伊斯兰堡的亲塔利班的Red Mosque的攻击怪罪于中国,随后发动了一系列针对在巴工作的中国工人的袭击作为报复。北京对于与塔利班有联系的组织如何看待中国的新疆政策而感到愈发紧张。2011年一位中国妇女在白沙瓦遭受枪击,这是第一次(也是唯一一次)巴塔发言人声称是为了“为中国政府杀害我们的新疆MSL兄弟复仇”而发动袭击。

Nonetheless, sources in Pakistan who have talked to the militant commanders say that senior Taliban leaders are keen not to alienate Beijing -- they have enough enemies already. The Afghan Taliban continues to see the benefit of close ties with one of the few countries that can restrain their sometimes-overbearing Pakistani sponsors. As a result, according to Chinese sources who work closely with the Foreign Ministry in Beijing, Taliban interlocutors have provided the same reassurances to China that they gave in the past: they will not allow Afghanistan to be used as a base of attacks and want to develop economic relations with the Chinese. But these sources also say that Chinese officials remain apprehensive. They doubt the Taliban's capacity and willingness to deliver on its promises, particularly on the matter of safe havens for Uighur militants, and they fear a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would destabilize Pakistan and the region. Beijing has therefore been increasingly keen to see a political settlement in Afghanistan that ensures a stable balance of power
然而来自巴基斯坦与军方指挥官有联系的消息人士称塔利班的高层并不希望疏远北京——他们已经有太多的敌人了。中国作为少数可以制衡有时显得飞扬跋扈的巴基斯坦资助者的国家之一,塔利班明白与中国保持紧密的联系会带来好处。结果据经常与北京的外交部工作的消息人士称,塔利班谈判者也提供了他们过去曾给予过的保证:他们不允许阿富汗成为恐怖袭击的基地而且愿意与中国发展经贸关系。但是这些消息也证明了中国官员仍然感到很忧虑,他们对塔利班实现诺言的能力以及决心持怀疑态度,特别是在阿富汗会成为维吾尔武装分子的安全避难所这一点上,他们担心塔利班如果在阿富汗胜利那将会使巴基斯坦变及其周围地区变的不稳定。所以北京越来越急切的希望达成一个政治和解以确保力量的平衡。

The United States shares this basic objective of a stable Afghanistan, and after years of pushing Beijing to increase its commitment there, U.S. officials told me they are happy that China has become more active in the region. Chinese officials have even mentioned to their U.S. counterparts the possibility of Beijing using its own contacts with the Taliban to help support reconciliation talks, according to sources familiar with the discussions.
美国也追求一个稳定的阿富汗这一基本的目标,在经过数年努力使中国增加其在该地区的投入后,美国官员告诉我他们乐于见到中国已经在该地区变得更积极。据与谈判熟悉的消息人士称中国官员已经提出北京利用其与塔利班的联系来协助和解谈判。

So will Beijing play a greater role in the upcoming peace talks among Kabul, the Taliban, and the United States? Probably not. Despite tentative support from all three parties, Beijing has been deterred not only by its caution over involvement with a risky process but by Islamabad. Pakistan is clearly uncomfortable with its closest friend's presence in a policy area that Beijing was previously willing to outsource to them.
所以北京会在与喀布尔,塔利班,美国的和平谈判中扮演更大的角色吗?可能不会,尽管有来自三方面的不确定的的支持,北京因为卷入这一危险过程所带来的警告以及伊斯兰堡而一直没有介入。以前在一些政治领域中国总是将工作外包给巴基斯坦,但是看到其最紧密的朋友在这些领域内的现身,巴基斯坦肯定感到会不舒服。

China's stance could prove useful for U.S. negotiators in Doha, however, if the talks move forward. While Beijing still treads carefully in its bilateral relationship with Pakistan, it knows it holds the upper hand, and is willing to exert pressure when important Chinese interests are at stake. China prioritizes stability in Afghanistan over sustaining Pakistani influence in the region; sources in Beijing who follow discussions between the two sides say that officials have made this increasingly clear to Islamabad.
然而,如果谈判进一步向前推进,中国的立场或许会在多哈与美国的谈判中被证明是有用的。中国仍然会密切地推进其与巴基斯坦的双边关系,而且他也明白这会使其占据上风,当中国的重要利益面临威胁时时将会施加压力。中国更为重视的是阿富汗的稳定而不是巴基斯坦在该地区的影响力。来自北京参与两边讨论的消息人士称中国官员已经将此立场日益明确的传递给伊斯兰堡。

In the 1990s, China paid little attention as Afghanistan slid into civil war and the Taliban seized control of the country. Now, with greater interests at stake, it doesn't want to see the same story play out after the U.S. withdrawal in 2014. If history were to repeat itself, however, there are no prizes for guessing which country would be the first to send a business delegation to Kandahar after the Taliban's return.
在90年代,中国对于阿富汗陷入内战不太关心然后塔利班控制了这个国家。现在,随着越来越大的利益受到威胁,在美国2014年撤军后中国不想看到历史重演。但是如果将来历史重演,我们肯定会猜到当塔利班回归后谁会向坎大哈派遣第一个贸易代表团。
美帝都有跟人家对话的打算了,中帝为何不能?何况还挨着边境直接影响安全呢。
对话是应该的吧,小白兔嘛,人畜无害,当然更愿意对话解决问题。
提前布局,有备无患。
官方未公布,P民知道个啥
讥讽兔子没有原则么?来自: Android客户端
显然阿富汗政府无法消灭塔利班,美国也不行,只能对话。